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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5636
This paper examines how different types of workers in 17 
middle-income countries were affected by labor market 
retrenchment during the great recession. Impacts on 
different types of workers varied by country and were 
only weakly related to the severity of the shock. Among 
active workers, youth experienced by far the largest 
adverse impacts on employment, unemployment, and 
wage employment, particularly relative to older adults. 
The percentage employment reductions, for example, 
were greatest for youth in each sector of the economy, 
as firms reacted to the shock by substituting away from 
inexperienced workers. Employment rates, as a share 
of the population, also plummeted for men. Larger 
drops in male employment were primarily attributable 
This paper is a product of the Social Protection and Labor Unit, Human Development Network. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors 
may be contacted at  ycho1@worldbank.org or dnewhouse@worldbank.org.  
to men’s higher initial rate of employment, although 
men’s concentration in the hard-hit industrial sector also 
played an important role. Within each sector, percentage 
employment declines were similar for men and women. 
Added worker effects among women were mild, even 
among less-educated workers. Differences in labor market 
outcomes across education groups and urban or rural 
residence tended to be smaller. These findings bolster the 
case for targeted support to displaced youth and wage 
employees. Programs targeted to female and unskilled 
workers should be undertaken with appropriate caution 
or empirical support from timely data, as they may not 
benefit the majority of affected workers.  
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1  Introduction 
Labor market outcomes are a critical determinant of household well-being during an economic crisis, 
especially in developing countries where labor is usually the main source of income. Understanding how 
labor market outcomes changed for different groups during the most recent downturn is therefore an 
important first step in crafting appropriate and well-targeted policies to respond to future crises. This 
paper examines which groups of workers in developing counties were most affected by labor market 
retrenchment during the great recession. The analysis sets aside other important dimensions affecting 
income and household well-being, such as changes in transfers, remittances and consumption patterns, 
and focuses only on changes in labor market outcomes.   
The vulnerability of different types of workers to economic downturns remains subject to debate, and 
targeted policies in response to the crisis were typically based on ad-hoc or institutional considerations. 
Labor  market  assessments  and  anecdotal  evidence  typically  emphasizes  the  vulnerability  of  young, 
unskilled,  or  female  workers.  Although  it  is  widely  accepted  that  youth  suffered  disproportionate 
increases in unemployment during the latest downturn, less is known about youths’ adjustment along 
other dimensions, and there is no similar consensus regarding the relative vulnerability of female and 
unskilled workers. Furthermore, conclusions are often inferred from past crises, data from advanced 
countries, or data from particular developing countries. Few studies have examined the impact of a 
recession on different types of workers across a wide range of developing countries, and this is the first 
to  our  knowledge  that  compares  disparities  in  labor  market  outcomes  across  several  potentially 
vulnerable groups.   
This study examines changes in labor market trends during the crisis for different types of workers, 
defined by their gender, age, education, and urban or rural residence. Data are taken from 17 middle-
income countries that field household surveys at least once per year. The outcomes measure aspects of 
individuals’  main  labor  market  activities  and  job  quality.  In  particular,  the  indicators  capture  labor 
market activity, as measured by the ratios of employment, unemployment, and non-participation to 
total population, and unemployment among the active labor force. Proxies for job quality include the 
share  of  the  labor  force  employed  in  the  agriculture  sector,  and  importantly,  wage  employment. 
Changes in wages, hours worked, and earnings among workers are also presented when available. We 
focus on how labor market trends for each group changed during the crisis and how these changes 
affected their relative performance. For example, youth are almost always less likely to be employed 
than adults, but if the employment gap between youth and adults widened more rapidly after the crisis 
than before, we conclude that the crisis disproportionately affected youth employment.  
Our  main  findings  are  as  follows:  first,  youth  generally  suffered  the  largest  adverse  impacts  on 
employment,  unemployment,  and  wage  employment,  particularly  relative  to  older  adults.  Youth 
experienced  greater  percentage  reductions  in  employment  within  each  sector  and  status  of 3 
 
employment,  but  did  not  experience  disproportionate  reductions  in  earnings  or  wages.
 2 This  is 
consistent with firms, facing declining revenue and economic uncertainty, deciding to let go or not hire 
relatively inexperienced young workers.   
Second, a substantially larger share of men than women suffered adverse labor market impacts. Men’s 
greater employment loss stems primarily from men’s higher employment rates, and partly from their 
greater concentration in the hard-hit industrial sector. Gender differences in employment and wage 
employment,  as  a  share  of  the  population,  were  surprisingly  high,  comparable  in  size  to  the  gap 
between youth and adults.  Among active workers, however, increases in unemployment were only 
moderately greater for men than women. Unlike youth, men and women experienced roughly equal 
percentage reductions in employment within each sector, suggesting that individual employers were 
neither more nor less likely to shed workers of either gender.  
Third, added worker effects for women appear to be mild. Labor force participation declined slightly 
more for men than women. Furthermore, gender disparities in participation were roughly equal for less 
and more educated workers, suggesting that unlike in past crises, the added worker effect was not 
particularly strong for less educated workers.  
Finally, less educated and urban workers fared unexpectedly well. Although data on urban and rural 
outcomes are limited, the available evidence shows few systematic differences. In general, differences 
between less and more educated workers are also smaller than those by age and gender, although very 
highly educated workers were better protected from employment loss.  
These findings suggest two main policy lessons. First, policies targeted to youth that increase labor 
demand and facilitate informed employment decisions can help mitigate employment loss during the 
shock. Potential policy options for youth range from active labor market programs, such as job search 
assistance  and  the  dissemination  of  labor  market  information,  to  sub-minimum  wages  and  wage 
subsidies. Second, since programs targeted to unskilled or female workers may not benefit the majority 
of affected workers, expanding or maintaining these programs in response to a crisis should be done 
with appropriate caution and strong empirical support based on timely country data.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing studies that investigate explanations of why 
labor  market  adjustments  vary  for  different  types  of  workers.  Section  3  describes  the  data  and 
methodology used in the analysis. Section 4 presents basic descriptive statistics on the size of the shock 
and the nature of the adjustments in aggregate labor market indicators, and Section 5 presents and 
analyzes disparities in the outcomes of different groups of workers. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
                                                            
2 It is also possible that the wage differences between groups are also mitigated by selection rather than rigidity. 
For example, average wages could rise for youth despite greater declines in demand if the lowest-wage youth were 
rationed out of jobs.   4 
 
 
2 What Explains Differential Impacts across Groups? 
 
Studies of past crises and the current great recession typically refer to three potential mechanisms to 
explain particular groups’ vulnerability to economic downturns. These are: Differences in workers’ initial 
exposure  to  the  shock,  firms’  employment  decision  during  a  downturn,  and  workers’  labor  market 
behavior in response to household income declines.   
Sectoral  employment  differences  are  particularly  salient  for  women.
3 Worldwide,  women  are 
moderately more likely than men to work in the service sector rather than the industrial sector (ILO, 
2010b).
4 Initially, the brunt of the current crisis was borne by workers in heavily affected sectors such as 
manufacturing, construction, and financial services. Partly as a result of occupational seg regation, both 
current and past recessions in the United States have caused greater job losses for men, who are 
disproportionately represented in vulnerable sectors (Elsby et al., 2010). In Canada and Finland, initial 
reductions in employment during the cu rrent recession were also greater in male -dominated sectors 
such as manufacturing, construction, and finance (ILO, 2010b).  However, several studies emphasize the 
potential vulnerability of women, based on women’s increasing participation in the globalized workplace 
(Sabarwal,  2011),  or  assertions  that  women  are  over-represented  in  export-oriented  manufacturing 
sectors hit hardest by the crisis (Ghosh, 2010, Whalby, 2009, ILO, 2010). In fact, for 16 of the 17 counties 
in this analysis, men were more concentrated in the industrial sector than women (See Figure A1.).  
 
In contrast to gender, less evidence exists regarding occupational segregation by age, education, and 
region. In the 17 countries in our sample, differences in sectoral employment patterns between youth 
and adults tend to be small (Figure A2). This is consistent with a study of several European and North 
American  countries  that  found  mixed  evidence  of  a  link  between  pre-crisis  patterns  of  youth 
employment and subsequent increases in youth unemployment; there was a marked relationship for 
construction but none for manufacturing (Verick, 2009). With respect to differences in education and 
region, less educated and rural workers are more likely to participate in agriculture, which may help 
insulate them from this and other downturns. We know of no study, however, that describes in detail 
how sectoral employment patterns depend on education and region of residence. 
The second main mechanism that can explain differential impacts are the profit-maximizing decisions of 
firms. Firms can respond to a crisis by adjusting employment, wages, and hours. Workers’ level of firm 
specific skills, labor market attachment, and labor market regulations all influence firms’ employment 
decisions. In particular, firms may find young and unskilled workers more dispensable because they have 
                                                            
3 See, for example, Polochek (1979, 1985) and other references in Altonji and Blank (1999)  
4 The ILO estimates that, in 2009, 47 percent of women worldwide worked in services, while 37 percent worked in 
agriculture and 16 in manufacturing. The corresponding percentages for men are 40, 33, and 27. Unfortunately, 
the ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labor Market does not disaggregate sectoral employment by age, education, or 
region.  5 
 
acquired fewer important firm-specific skills (World Bank, 2009). There are also concerns that firms 
could shed female workers first because they are less attached to the labor market, due to child-rearing 
career disruptions, or because they are less likely to be bread winners. During the Asian financial crisis, 
South  Korean  women  experienced  7  times  higher  lay  off  rates  than  men  (Seguino,  2009).  Another 
possibility is that labor regulations affect firms’ demand for certain groups during a crisis. Minimum 
wages, for example, may reduce firms’ downward wage flexibility for young and unskilled workers, who 
tend  to  earn  lower  wages.  This  could  lead  to  greater  reductions  in  employment  and  increases  in 
unemployment  among  these  groups.  Finally,  existing  employment  protection  legislation  such  as 
severance  pay,  restrictions  on  collective  dismissals,  and  conditions  for  termed  contracts  can  also 
disproportionally  affect  new  workers  vis-à-vis  incumbent  ones.  Indeed,  the  proportion  of  youth  in 
temporary contracts, who would have limited benefit packages, is rising in the advanced economies 
(OECD, 2010). However, there is little evidence on the impacts of labor market regulations on particular 
groups during a crisis. While one study suggested that employment protection legislation may have 
prevented a surge of layoffs among young workers in Europe (Verick, 2009), evidence on how these 
regulations affect different types of workers during a crisis remains limited.   
 
The  third  main  mechanism  that  can  contribute  to  differential  impacts  on  employment  and 
unemployment is household labor supply decisions. The most commonly invoked pattern is the added 
worker effect, where women compensate for falls in household income by rejoining the workforce. 
Studies  suggest  that  female  labor  force  participation  is  counter-cyclical,  especially  for  poorer,  less-
educated  workers  in  low  income  economies  (Sabarwal  et  al.,  2011;  Choudhry  et  al.,  2010).  During 
Argentina’s  financial  crisis,  for  example,  job  exits  increased  for  both  men  and  women,  but  women 
experienced smaller employment losses due to an increase in job entry.
5 In theory, youth could face 
similar pressures; families facing job loss or a fall in real income may withdraw youth from school, or idle 
youth may be forced to work. Evidence from the Mexican tequila crisis, however, indicates that most of 
the burden of the adjustment, in terms of increased labor force participation, fell on wives rather than 
children (Skoufias and Parker, 2006).  In rural areas, employment declines may be smaller, if women and 
youth joining the workforce find it particularly convenient to enter family businesses, which are more 
common in rural areas.   
 
How  have these  three mechanisms  affected  the vulnerability of different groups  during  downturns? 
While several studies have examined households’ vulnerability to crises, fewer have documented their 
effects on individual workers.
6 Most studies of crisis impacts focus on Europe and the Uni ted States 
(Verick, 2009, OECD, 2010, Elsby et al., 2010,) or highlight the experience of particular groups or 
countries (ILO 2010a, 2010b, Ha et al., 2010, Sabarwal et al., 2011, Leung et al., 2009).  
The best existing evidence on the effect of past crises on workers’ income and employment exploits 
longitudinal  data  from  Indonesia  and  Urban  Argentina.  Men  and  women  experienced  equally 
                                                            
5 See McKenzie (2004). 
6 Households’ vulnerability and response to economic crises has been explored in Peru (Glewwe and Hall, 1998), 
Mexico (Cunningham and Maloney, 2001 and Mckenzie, 2004), Russia (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2003), Indonesia 
(Strauss et al., 2004) and Argentina (Corbacho et al., 2007), among others. 6 
 
destructive falls in real wages in both Indonesia and Argentina. Employment patterns were different, 
however.  In  Indonesia,  female  employment  fell  markedly  less  than  male  employment,  as  women 
entered  self  and  family  employment  to  offset  job  losses  in  the  formal  sector  (Smith  et  al,  2002). 
Employment in medium and large manufacturing firms also declined more for men than women, as 
women were overrepresented in larger and exporting firms, which were more resilient to the crisis. 
(Hallward-Driemeier et al, 2010). During Argentina’s 1995 crisis, however, employment fell equally for 
both men and women (Mckenzie, 2004).  
Most  preliminary  studies  of  the  current  crisis  have  mostly  emphasized  large  increases  in  youth 
unemployment.
7 Most of this evidence is from OECD countries, and indicates that youth unemployment 
skyrocketed in 2009. In addition, there are some indications that youth were more likely to shift to 
informal sector employment in six Latin American countries (Ha et al., 2010). This appears to be more 
consistent with past experience in Indonesia than Argentina. In Indonesia, employment declined slightly 
more for youth than adults, largely because older women rejoined the labor force in large numbers. 
Young  workers,  particularly  women,  experienced  somewhat  larger  wage  declines  than  their  older 
counterparts.  In  Argentina,  meanwhile,  young  and  old  workers  experienced  similar  wage  and 
employment changes.  
Existing  analyses  of  the  labor  market  effects  of  the  current  crisis  on  men  and  women  are  mixed. 
Preliminary ILO estimates suggest that men and women have experienced roughly equal increases in 
unemployment, from which they conclude that the downturn has affected male and female outcomes 
more or less equally (ILO, 2010). Other studies, mostly drawing on data from Europe and the US, suggest 
that men suffered larger unemployment increases than women due to their concentration in banking 
and finance, and export oriented industry sector (Barakat, et al, 2010, Eurostat 2009, Elsby 2010, World 
Bank 2010c).   
The experience of educated workers depends on the nature of the crisis, although some studies suggest 
the current crisis has led to larger employment reductions for less educated workers. In the US, the 
current recession reduced employment more for less educated workers (Elsby et al., 2010). Similarly, in 
South Africa, additional education substantially reduced the risk of employment loss (Leung et al., 2010). 
Finally, preliminary evidence from China suggests that the crisis disproportionately affected unskilled 
migrant workers (Cai et al., 2010).
8 This pattern is different from the Indonesian and Argentinian crises, 
where employment and  earnings losses were greatest for  better educated women. In both countries, 
declines in incomes were similar for less educated and better educated men, but significantly larger for 
educated women than less educated women. Educated women were also particularly likely to lose their 
job or exit employment.  
                                                            
7 Examples include Ha et al., 2010, Barakat et al. 2010,   IMF and ILO, 2010, Bell and Blanchflower, 2010, Verick, 
2010, OECD 2010 
8 Mixed results are also found when looking at household income or consumption. Households with better 
educated heads experienced smaller consumption drops in Peru and Argentina (Glewwe and Hall, 1998 and 
Corbacho et al., 2007) but larger income and consumption reductions in Mexico (Mckenzie, 2004) 7 
 
We know of no analysis of the effects of the current crisis on urban and rural workers. During the East 
Asian crisis, the initial impact of the crisis was felt particularly hard in the urban manufacturing and 
construction sectors.
9 In Indonesia, both overall and salaried employment declines were larger in urban 
areas, and urban women suffered substantially larger wage declines than rural women.  
To sum up, existing empirical evidence from past and present crises suggests four hypotheses:  
  Men and women experienced roughly equal falls in income and employment, although in some 
settings, the added worker effect may lead to smaller falls among women.  
  Young workers experienced greater increases in unemployment and informal employment than 
adult workers.   
  Impacts on less educated workers were more severe than better educated workers, but the 
results depend on the country context and the nature of the shock.  
  The shock may have reduced employment and earnings more for urban workers than rural 
workers.  
Evidence on the vulnerability of different types of workers to this shock remains quite limited. Past crises 
in Argentina and Indonesia may not be relevant to the current great recession, since the macroeconomic 
causes and consequences are very different, and most initial evidence on the current crisis has focused 
on unemployment and is often limited to OECD or European countries.
10 
3  Data and Methodology 
3.1  Data 
This analysis draws on repeated cross sectional household data from 17 countries (Table 1).
11  These 
include five Latin American and Caribbean countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico), 
seven countries in the Europe and Central Asia region (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania and Turkey), two counties in East Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines), two countries in Middle 
East and North Africa countries (Egypt and Jordan) and South Africa. Countries differ in terms of the 
indicators collected, span and frequency of data, and coverage of rural areas: ECA countries do not 
report hours and earnings, and include only the means of key variables by demographic cell rather than 
individual workers’ outcomes; three LAC countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) cover only urban areas; 
and earnings are often reported for salaried workers (Chile, and Indonesia). The size of the shock is 
measured as a change in GDP growth rates, and varies widely, from 1.7 percentage points in Indonesia 
                                                            
9 See Fallon and Lucas (2002). 
10 In particular, exchange rates have changed relatively little during this crisis, while both Argentina and Indonesia 
experienced extraordinary currency devaluations during their crises.  
11 For European countries, we use Eurostat Survey data instead of individual country’s Labor Force Survey, which 
were not available. Eurostat provides the mean of key labor market indicators by demographic cells. For European 
countries, age, education, and gender estimates rely on data from the 8 cells defined by the three characteristics, 
while urban/rural estimates rely on a separate set of 8 cells defined by residence, age, and gender.  8 
 
to 21.3 percentage points in Lithuania.
 12 Europe and Latin American countries are over-represented in 
the data, but these were the two regions most affected by the shock.  
The  data  contain  information  on  a  wide  variety  of  job  and  worker  characteristics.    Labor  market 
indicators  include  job  status  (e.g.,  wage  employment,  self-employment,  or  family  work)  sector 
(agriculture,  industry,  or  service),  participation,  employment,  unemployment,  hours,  and  earnings.
13  
The activity indicators are the share of the population that is employed, unemployed, and out of labor 
force, as well as the standard unemployment rate. Meanwhile, the analysis focuses on four key worker 
characteristics -- gender, age, education and region (urban/rural) -- which are present in most surveys.
14  
Changes in the evolution of these indicators for different groups shed light on how they were affected by 
the downturn.  For example, group differences in employment loss could reflect both firm employment 
decisions and household labor supply decisions, but the former is more consistent with increases in 
unemployment while the latter could be explained by smaller declines in participation. To measure job 
quality, we examine employment status (the share of labor force working as the wage employed, self-
employed or family worker) and sector (the share of working in the agricultural, industry and service 
sector), as well as average earnings, hours, and wage rates where available. A significant portion of 
workers in many developing countries are self-employed working poor, earning small profits, such as 
smallholder farmers or street retailers. Unemployed or idle adults may be forced to take these low 
paying  jobs  to  cope  with  the  downturn,  in  order  to  mitigate  losses  to  household  income  during 
recessions, which  would appear  as an increase  in the  share of the  labor force in self-employed or 
agricultural work.   
Normative interpretation of the results requires care because indicators can have ambiguous welfare 
implications. Changes in economic activities, in particular, are not straightforward to interpret. Greater 
employment  declines  for  men  than  women,  for  example,  do  not  imply  that  men  were  more 
disadvantaged  during  the  crisis,  if  for  example  there  was  a  large  increase  in  female  distress  work. 
Compared  with  changes  in  employment  and  unemployment,  declines  in  wage  employment,  non-
agricultural employment, and wage rates can more confidently be interpreted as a welfare loss, largely 
because wage and salaried jobs and non-agricultural jobs tend to be more productive and offer greater 
access to benefits.
15  Changes in earnings and wage rates  can also be interpreted normatively with 
greater  confidence  than  employment  changes,  since  they  directly  impact   workers’  income. 
                                                            
12 The slowdown is calculated as the difference between GDP growth rate in 2009 and the average GDP growth 
rates over 2007-2008. See Appendix Table A1 for calculation of slowdown in GDP growth rates in each country. 
13 In some countries, these data also contain information on household responses to the crises and individuals’ 
labor market transitions during the crisis, but these topics are left for future research. 
14 For detailed information on data construction for our analysis, refer to the technical note in the Appendix. 
15 This does not imply or assume that all self -employed workers are unproductive, or that all self -employed 
workers are excluded from wage employment, as many workers are self -employed by choice. Workers often 
choose to start a business, for example, because they have acquired sufficient assets to earn greater profits in self-
employment, or because they value time flexibility. The use of wage employment as a proxy for changes in job 
quality during the crisis is based on the plausible assumptio n that the downturn, rather than raising preferences 
for self-employment among workers, reduced demand for wage workers. If wages are rigid, then reductions in 
demand would ration workers out of wage employment jobs, forcing them to enter self-employment.  9 
 
Unfortunately, there are important concerns about the coverage and accuracy of earnings data. Fewer 
countries collect earnings data than employment data, and some countries only collect earnings data for 
salaried workers. The profits of self-employed workers are notoriously difficult to measure accurately, 
and inaccurate measures of inflation can also introduce additional noise into earnings data.
16  
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
Workers are divided into 16 cells, based on their gender, age, education and location of residence. Only 
workers between age 15 and 64 are included in the sample. Age is broken into youth (age 15-24) and 
adults  (age  of  25-64),  and  education  is  grouped  into  the  least  educated  (those  that  completed 
elementary or junior high) and more educated (secondary level and above).  Average indicators are 
taken for each cell, country, and survey, weighted according to their sample weights. With the exception 
of education groups in the European countries, the dataset is defined consistently for all 17 countries.
17  
Labor market activity and type of job indicators are considered both as a ratio of the population and of 
the labor force. Indicators of interest include the labor market activities over population (employment, 
unemployment, nonparticipation ratios), sector and status over labor force (share of each sector and 
status among labor force), and earnings and hours information for workers (earnings, wages, and hours). 
First we look at trends in employment, unemployment, and non-participation rates as a share of the 
population.  Population  trends  may  be  relevant  for  policies,  such  as  universal  transfers,  that  are 
delivered outside the labor market. To better understand changes among potential workers and to 
inform the design of labor market programs, we then examine labor market outcomes for the active 
labor  force.  The  focus  is  on  shifts  in  sectors,  employment  status,  and  unemployment.  Finally,  in 
countries where the data are available, we report changes in average earnings, wages, and hours of 
work. 
The focus is on how disruptions in labor market trends during the crisis varied for different group of 
workers. A simple way of looking at the crisis impact on various groups of workers is to compare pre and 
post outcomes for each group. However, this comparison may be misleading if baseline trends and 
initial labor market performance vary across groups. Even before the crisis, socioeconomic changes in 
each  country  were  affecting  different  groups  in  different  ways.  For  example,  in  many  countries, 
employment rates were growing faster for women than men, due to trends in educational achievement 
and cultural norms that encourage greater female employment. To take this into account, the analysis 
examines how each group’s trend changed, relative to their pre-crisis trend. In other words, the key 
indicator is the rate at which changes in each indicator slowed down or sped up, compared across 
groups.    
                                                            
16 Comparing changes in urban and rural earnings is also problematic in countries that only collect price indices in 
urban areas.  
17 In ECA countries, the least educated group is those with secondary education or below, as their education level 
is higher than other regions.  10 
 
The method used to calculate changes in trends is illustrated using data from Mexico.  Panel A of Table 2 
gives the employment ratios for low educated male youth in urban areas, for each quarter between 
2007 and 2009. We then calculate the change of employment ratio relative to the same quarter in the 
previous year. The employment ratio changed from 57.3 percent in the first quarter of 2007 to 57.8 
percent in the same quarter in 2008, yielding a slight increase by 0.5 percentage points. For each cell, we 
then take the average of these changes across all pre-crisis periods (up until 4
th quarter of 2008) and all 
post-crisis periods (from 1
st quarter of 2009 and onwards).In this cell, the average year on year change in 
the  employment rate  after  the  crisis  trend in employment ratio  is  -3.6 percentage  points,  and  the 
average pre crisis trend is -0.3 percentage points, indicating that for this cell, growth in the employment 
ratio slowed by 3.3 percentage points. Taking a weighted average over all 16 cells, with weights equal to 
the cell population in this case, gives the overall change in the employment ratio. Among all Mexican 
workers, the employment ratio slowed by 1.7 percentage points (Panel B of Table 2). This difference, 
between the pre-crisis and post-crisis averages of year-on-year changes of the indicator, is used to 
measure workers’ labor market adjustment throughout this paper. 
Group Comparison  
The  analysis  examines  differences  in  labor  market  adjustment  by  group,  controlling  for  selected 
observable characteristics. In particular, we regress the change in the trend, described above, for each 
cell in each country on dummy variables for the four characteristics, separately for each outcome and 
country.
18  There are therefore 16 observations in each regression.  Using regression coefficients rather 
than simple tabulations isolates changes in the returns to a single characteristic, while holding the other 
three constant; for example, a rise in the coefficient on youth unemployment cannot be attributed to 
higher education levels among youth.  That is, we estimate the following equation (See Appendix B for 
more details regarding the specification):  
(1)                                                                
where  i Y
~
is the difference in the trend for each cell i in each country, and Men, Young, LowEduc, and 
Urban represent dummy variables for each group.  
We present the coefficients from the linear regressions to capture the difference between groups.  The 
sign and magnitude of each coefficient indicate each group’s relative vulnerability to the crisis compared 
to their counterparts. For example, a negative coefficient    on employment ratio suggests that men’s 
employment  deteriorated  more  rapidly  than  women’s.    Meanwhile,  the  relative  magnitudes  of  the 
coefficients indicate which groups were most exposed to the shock. For example, a value of    that is 
greater  in  absolute  value  than    would  indicate  that  age  disparities  were  larger  than  education 
disparities in the employment adjustment. 
 
                                                            
18 Observations are weighted both by the population weight for that cell, and by the number of unweighted 
observations used to generate the average, to adjust for heteroscedasticity in the cell mean outcomes.   11 
 
Decompositions 
Two Shapley decompositions are  employed to better understand the factors that account for group 
disparities in adjustments.
19 A natural first step is to decompose the changes in the employment ratio 
into portions explained by changes in the employment rate and labor force participation.
20 In other 
words,  a  decline  in  the  share  of  the  population  working  can  be  attributed  either  to  increased 
unemployment  or  reduced  labor  force  participation.  Formally,  using                      where 
                     denote the employment ratio, employment rate, and labor force participation, 
respectively, the change in employment ratio can be decomposed as below. 
(2)                       =                                     
 
where      denotes the average value over t and t+1.
21 The first term represents the portion explained by 
the change in the employment rate, while the second part represents the portion explained by change 
in labor force participation over time. We  calculate this decomposition for each group of gender, age, 
and education.  
The second and more novel decomposition builds on the discussion in the previous section to better 
understand  which  mechanisms  explain  group  differences  in  crisis  response.  We  decompose  group 
disparities in the slowdown in employment ratios into three components:  Differences in the initial level 
of employment, differences in the sectoral distribution of employment, and differences in percentage 
changes  in  employment  within  the  three  sectors.
22 The first of these  –  the  portion  of  employment 
change  due  to  initial  differences  in  employment  levels  –  indicates  the  extent  to  which  absolute 
disparities would result from equal percentage reduction in each group’s probability of working. The 
second component – the portion of the group disparity due to different distributions across sectors – 
gives an indication of the importance of occupational segregation in explaining group disparities. Finally, 
the  third  component  --  the  percentage  change  in  employment  within  firms  –  reflects  both  firm’s 
decision and workers’ supply side decisions. For example, a small third component for gender might 
suggest  that  firms  reduce  employment  proportionally  for  men  and  women.  However,  since  men 
typically  comprise  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  workforce,  proportional  reductions  for  men  and 
women will lead a greater absolute reduction in employment rates for men, which will be captured by 
the first component. The decomposition, while far from definitive, provides a useful summary of the 
                                                            
19 The Shapley approach decomposes the product of several factors by taking the simple average of factors’ 
contribution over all permutations, where one factor is varied while others are held constant. See Appendix B and 
Shorrocks (1999) for further details.   
20 To fix terminology, the employment ratio refers to the employment to population ratio, while the employment 
rate refers to employment as a proportion of the active labor force, which of course is the complement of the 
unemployment rate.  
21 The decomposition actually averages the results of two decomposition equations, of which Equation (2) is one. 
More detail can be found in appendix B.  
22 The three main sectors are agriculture, industry, and services.  
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relative importance of these three factors in explaining, in an accounting sense, differential adjustments 
among groups.  
To carry out this decomposition, the difference in the trend of each indicator for a particular group is 
rewritten as follows:  
(3)                                                      
where     is the percentage employment growth rate within sector  ,      is an initial employment level, 
and     is  the  share  of  the  group  in  sector   (See  Appendix  B  for  a  detailed  explanation  of  the 
decomposition). There are three factors that may explain the difference between men and women in 
the change of employment: the initial level of employment ratio (     , the sectoral distribution (   ), 
and the employment change within each sector     ). From equation (3), applying the decomposition to 
gender differences in employment, we can derive  
(4)                                                                                    
23 
 
The first term is the portion due to the gender differences in the initial employment level, the second 
part is the portion due to occupational segregation, and the third part is due to the differential growth 
rate within sector. Equation (4) is one of six potential ways to carry out the decomposition, and we use 
the average across all six. Of course, the same decomposition methodology can be applied to examine 
age,  education,  and  location  differences.  We  also  calculate  a  variant  that  examines  the  role  of 
segregation among wage or self-employed workers in accounting for group disparities.    
4  Aggregate Labor Market Adjustments 
 
We first present basic results on the extent of the shock and the overall nature of the labor market 
adjustment in the 17 countries. To illustrate how a country’s exposure to the crisis affected the labor 
market  adjustments  of  different  groups,  the  graphs  plot  the  magnitude  of  the  adjustment,  on  the 
vertical axis, against the size of the GDP slowdown. Figures 1-4 show the labor market adjustments for 
all individuals (Figure 1), labor force participants (Figures 2 and 3), and workers (Figure 4), sorting by the 
magnitude of the shock.
24 The horizontal axis in each figure indicates the severity of the crisis, as shown 
in Table 1.  The vertical axis is defined as slowdown in each indicator as explained in the previous 
section.
25  
While each country suffered declines in economic growth, the severity of the shock varied substantially 
from one country to the next. Countries in Asia tended to be less affected by the crisis, while countries in 
                                                            
23 See equation (A.3) through (A.6) in the appendix for a more detailed derivation. 
24 The labor market adjustments for all individuals, labor force participants, and workers, disaggregated by gender 
in each country, is presented in table A2 in the appendix. 
25 Recall that the indicator of interest is the difference between pre and post averages for changes in outcomes. 
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Europe suffered the largest declines in growth. Latvia and Lithuania in particular suffered tremendous 
economic disruptions, as growth rates in these countries slowed by roughly 20 percentage points in 
2009, compared to the average growth rates in the two prior years. Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Mexico also suffered severe slowdowns in growth, due to a decline in exports to Western Europe and 
the US. In contrast, a larger group of seven countries, including the non-Mexican Latin countries, Poland, 
Jordan, the Philippines, and South Africa were only moderately affected. Finally, Indonesia and Egypt 
escaped the brunt of the crisis, as growth only fell around 2 percentage points.  
The size of the adjustment in employment and unemployment may be related to countries’ labor market 
institutions.  Employment losses varied considerably across countries. Poland, Costa Rica, and Bulgaria, 
for  example,  experienced  unexpectedly  large  employment  losses,  given  their  moderate  decline  in 
growth, while Romania and Turkey experienced larger slowdowns in growth but substantially smaller 
employment  reductions  (Figure  1).
26 These patterns suggest that  countries with more  rigid labor 
markets fared somewhat better in maintaining employment during the crisis. For example, employment 
and wage employment growth fell relatively little in  Turkey and Romania, even though Turkey is 
probably among the most regulated labor markets in the OECD, with a low  Doing Business ranking in 
employing workers, and 40 percent of Romanian workers belong to a union.
27  Costa Rica and Bulgaria, 
where employment fell more, have relatively free labor markets among countries analyzed here: both 
countries score relatively highly on the Fraser index of labor market fr eedom, and only 13 percent of 
Costa Rican workers belong to a union (Freeman, 2009).
28 If labor markets with high firing costs 
responded to the crisis by reducing hours rather than shedding employment, employment loss may have 
been smaller in more rigid countries.
29 This is line with evidence that employment during the crisis fell 
slightly less in countries with higher firing costs (Khanna et al, forthcoming ) and other studies  also 
casting doubt on the link between existing measures of institutions and worse employment outcomes 
(Baker et al., 2004, Freeman, 2005).  
Employment declines translated more into increased unemployment than reduced participation (Figure 
1).
30 However,  the  extent  of  this  adjustment  also  varies  across  countries.  Bulgaria  and  Poland,  for 
example, experienced greater employment losses than would be expected based on the severity of the 
shock. While Bulgaria’s employment losses were largely explained by an increase in nonparticipation, 
large employment losses in Poland were entirely linked to unemployment increases. These patterns may 
                                                            
26 This is consistent with findings from previous studies. See World Bank (2010a). Two letters in Figures represent 
each country: AR (Argentina), BG (Bulgaria), BR (Brazil), CH (Chile), CR (Costa Rica), EG (Egypt), ID (Indonesia), JO 
(Jordan), LT (Lithuania), LV (Latvia), ME (Mexico), PH (Philippines), PL (Poland), RO (Romania), SA (South Africa), 
and TR (Turkey). 
27 Turkey ranked at 145 out of 183 countries in ‘employing workers’ in 2010 Doing Business, which reflects labor 
market rigidity with substantial hiring and firing costs. 
28 Labor market rigidity measures should be interpreted with caution because they may mask complex dynamics 
within the labor market. For example, Costa Rica experienced particularly large employment slow down among 
traditionally vulnerable group such as youth and least educated, which is in line with World Bank (2010b). This may 
suggest labor market flexibility or lack of protection, is concentrated among vulnerable group of workers.  
29 Unfortunately, hours information on these rigid countries mentioned is not available. 
30 Note by definition that the share of employed, unemployed, and out of labor force workers sums up to one, and 
the changes of each share sums up to zero. 14 
 
be  related  to  their  labor  market  policy  such  as  unemployment  insurance.  Poland’s  unemployment 
insurance has relatively high coverage and impacts compared to other East European countries, which 
may reduce the incentive of unemployed workers to leave the labor market (Vodopivec, 2009). 
Substantial declines in the share of wage employment among the labor force led to greater increases in 
unemployment  than  self-employment  (Figure  2).  Declines  in  the  share  of  wage  employment  and 
corresponding increases in unemployment were greater for more severely affected countries. Latvia and 
Lithuania experienced large declines in wage employment and slight shifts to self-employment. In other 
countries, declines in wage employment did not lead to an increase in self-employment. This suggests 
that self-employment did not serve as an informal safety net by absorbing displaced workers, except to 
a limited extent in the most severely affected countries.
31  
Declines in industrial sector employment, in most cases, were not absorbed by the service or agricultural 
scetors. The service sector did expand in Lithuania and Latvia, absorbing 60 percent of the decline in 
industrial  employment  (the  remainder  were  absorbed  by  increases  in  unemployment).  Excluding 
Lithuania and Latvia, there was little change in agriculture and service sector, and large decrease in 
industry tended to be reflected in increased in unemployment.   
Earnings  slowed  due  to  declines  in  both  hours  and  wage  growth,  but  there  was  no  discernible 
relationship between these indicators and the severity of the GDP shock. Figure 4 shows changes for 
earnings, hours, and wage rates, which unfortunately is limited to 8 countries. In some countries, such 
as  Argentina  and  Costa  Rica,  earnings  decreases  were  driven  by  declines  in  hours,  while  in  other 
countries such as Mexico, Jordan, and Egypt earnings declined were mainly due to decreased wage rates.  
Wage  rate  declines  do  not  appear  to  be  systematically  related  to  shifts  to  less  productive  self-
employment and agricultural employment. Self-employment rates changed little in Jordan, despite a 
large decline in wage rates. Egypt, on the other hand, experienced even larger declines in wage rates 
despite  falling  into  self-employment  and  agricultural  employment,  illustrating  the  extent  to  which 
declines in labor demand translate into wage declines varies from country to country. 
Overall, the aggregate indicators suggest that retrenchment reduced employment, particularly in the 
industrial sector, and increased unemployment. There is little indication that the agricultural sector or 
self-employed jobs increased dramatically during the crisis, or that the crisis led workers to withdraw 
from the labor force. 
 
     
                                                            
31 Egypt  is  an  outlier  where  wage  employment  increased  and  share  of  self  employment  and  agricultural 
employment decreased. Given the openness of Egypt to the international financial market, economic slowdown in 
Egypt must be largely affected by the food price crisis rather than the financial crisis, which may explain a large 
slowdown in agriculture. A decrease in agriculture is probably highly associated with a decline in self employment 
and a slight increase in wage employment. 15 
 
5  Group Differences in Labor Market Adjustments 
 
This section examines how adjustments varied for different types of workers. As discussed above, we 
examine how trends in indicators changed, conditional on gender (men relative to women), age (young 
relative to older workers), education (less educated relative to more educated workers), and location 
(urban  relative  to  rural  workers).  A  key  distinction  is  whether  labor  market  changes  are  measured 
relative to the population, as in the employment to population ratio, or relative to the active labor force. 
The former shows which groups were most affected by the shock overall, while the latter measures how 
the crisis affected different types of active workers. Finally, we investigate how initial differences in 
employment rates, systematic differences in sector of work, and percentage employment reductions 
within sector contributed to group differences in employment rates.   
5.1 Group Differences in the Population 
There  are  striking  differences  between  different  groups’  employment,  wage  employment,  and 
unemployment  outcomes.  Figures  5,  6,  and  7  show  how  these  three  indicators  varied  for  different 
groups.  As  in  the  previous  section,  the  vertical  axis  shows  the  percentage  point  adjustment  in  a 
particular labor market indicator and the horizontal axis shows the slowdown in GDP growth. Each point 
represents a coefficient from a regression for a particular country, in which the dependent variable is 
the difference in the rate in which the indicator slowed or accelerated during the crisis, as indicated in 
equation (1). The independent variables are dummy variables for men, youth, less educated, and urban 
residence.
32 For convenience, throughout this section we refer to these as changes for particular groups 
as  if  they  were  simple  unconditional  trends,  even  though  they  are  in  fact  conditional  regression 
coefficients.
33 Also  for  simplicity,  the  terms   slowdown,  fall,  acceleration,  rise,  and  change  and 
adjustment are all used interchangeably during the discussion, and all refer to the change in the rate of 
year on year change.
34 
As a proportion of the population, employment and wage employment slowed most for men and youth. 
The left two panels of Figure 5 show that both men and youth experienced larger falls in employment, 
as a share of population, in 13 of the 17 countries. This is reflected in the average disparity across the 17 
countries, which is about 1 percentage point for youth and slightly greater for men. The labor market 
impacts on men and youth are even more apparent when examining wage employment (Figure 6). A 
greater percentage of women lost wage jobs than men in only two countries – Jordan and Egypt – and 
wage employment fell noticeably more for adults than youth only in South Africa. Age disparities are 
                                                            
32 As mentioned above, there are 16 observations in each regression, one for each of the 16 cells defined by these 
four characteristics. In European countries, the full 16 cells are unavailable. In these countries, cells defined by 
gender, age, and education are used for those three groups, while cells by urban residence, age, and gender are 
used to generate urban/rural disparities.  
33  We also generated unconditional results and the patterns are qualitatively similar to the conditional results in all 
cases.   
34 For example, a negative coefficient on the youth dummy in the employment regression is described as “youth 
employment fell” or “Youth employment slowed”.   16 
 
even greater when comparing youth with older adults aged 45 to 65 (see Figure A3), as firms retained 
their most experienced workers.  
Better educated and urban residents, to a lesser extent, also suffered  disproportionate employment 
losses. The third panel of Figure 5 tells a similar story for better educated workers, where employment 
slowed more than it did for less educated workers in 14 of 17 countries. Breaking education into three 
groups,  as  shown  in  Figure  A3,  shows  a  slightly  more  nuanced  story:  The  best  educated  and  least 
educated workers experienced the smallest employment losses, while it was the workers in the middle 
of the education distribution, typically with a junior high education, that experienced the greatest losses 
in employment.
35 Finally, the rightmost panel shows that in 8 of 10 countries, employment slowed more 
in urban areas than rural areas, though differences were small in several cases.
36   
Disparities  in  employment  adjustments  between  groups  were  sizeable,  in  comparison  with  overall 
employment declines. This is true even in Latvia and Lithuania, where overall employment rates fell by a 
hefty 5 to 9 percentage points (Figure 1).  In these two countries,  employment, for example, fell by 6 
percentage points more for men, 2 to 4 percentage points more for youth, and 2 to 6 percentage points 
more for least educated. In Costa Rica, where overall employment fell by about 2.5 percentage points, 
the 4 percentage point disparity faced by young workers is very large in comparison.  
Added worker effects for women appear to be mild. Men, youth, and urban workers experienced slightly 
larger increases in nonparticipation (Figure 7). For youth, this suggests that increased school attendance 
and discouragement slightly outweighed any added worker effect. Women, on the other hand, were 
slightly less likely to drop out of the labor force than men, reflecting small added worker effects.  Group 
differences in participation, however, tend to be small as employment declines for male and youth were 
reflected mostly in increased unemployment rather than nonparticipation.  
Even among less educated women, there is no evidence of a strong added worker effect. Experiences 
form past crises indicate that, during crises, better educated women tend to exit and less educated 
women tend to enter the labor market (Sabarwal et al., 2011). Figure A4 shows gender disparities in 
employment, wage employment, and non-participation for less educated and better educated women. 
For each of the three indicators, there are few differences between less and better educated women. 
This suggests that in contrast to previous crises, that in this sample of middle and upper-middle income 





                                                            
35 In the European countries, the middle education group has a high school education.  
36 See Figure A1 in Appendix for three group comparisons in age and education groups. 
37 See  Figure  A2  in  Appendix  for  the  patterns  of  gender  disparities  in  employment,  unemployment,  and 
nonparticipation ratios disaggregated by education group. 17 
 
5.2  Group Differences among Active Workers  
 
Youth experienced by far the largest rise in unemployment. Unemployment rates also increased more for 
men and urban workers, but the differences were much smaller than those by age. The second panel of 
Figure  8  shows  large  disparities  in  the  increase  of  youths’  unemployment  rate  relative  to  adults, 
averaging about 3 percentage points. Disproportionate unemployment increase for youth occurred in all 
countries except Egypt. There is no clear relationship between the size of the shock and the increase in 
youth unemployment, however. Disparities were largest in Latvia and Lithuania, but they were also large 
in  Costa  Rica,  Poland,  and  Indonesia  –  countries  that  escaped  the  full  brunt  of  the  crisis.  Gender 
disparities in unemployment rates were not  as large, with male increases typically one half to one 
percentage point greater. Urban workers also experienced larger rises in unemployment, in 7 of the 10 
countries for which data are available, but the disparity tended to be small.  
A large percentage of active youth also shifted out of wage employment (Figure 9). In 15 of 17 countries, 
wage employment rates, as a proportion of the active labor force, declined more for youth than adults. 
Differences  between  youth  and  adults  were  particularly  large,  as  increases  exceeded  3  percentage 
points in seven countries. Although declines were larger for men than women in 13 countries, gender 
differences tend to be small. The average gender and education disparities are largely driven by Latvia 
and Lithuania, and education disparities in other countries are less clear. Similarly, differences in wage 
employment between urban and rural residents are not systematic. 
Men and less educated workers, to a lesser extent, also experienced larger increases in unemployment 
and declines in wage employment. Unemployment rose at least as much for men as women in 16 of the 
19  countries,  though  differences  tend  to  be  small  particularly,  compared  to  the  age  disparities. 
Education disparities are more muddled, as in several countries unemployment and wage employment 
outcomes were worse for better educated workers.  On average however, in large part because of large 
disparities  in  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  unemployment  increases  were  larger  for  less  educated  workers. 
While group disparities in Latvia and Lithuania are larger than others in most indicators, the education 
gap in wage employment declines were particularly large, reflecting the extreme distress experienced by 
less educated workers in these severely hit countries. 
Disparities in earnings, hours, and wages across groups are less pronounced than those in activity, sector, 
and status of employment. Youth, despite greater reductions in employment and wage employment, did 
not experience a larger earnings reduction than adults, and there is no sign of a decrease in the wage 
rate of youth. This, with a large increase in youth unemployment, suggests that downward wage rigidity 
impinged on labor flexibility and denied youth the opportunity of remaining employed at lower wages.
38  
                                                            
38 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is also possible that higher-wage youth were better able to 
maintain employment during the crisis, masking the drop in earnings due to declining wages.  However, this 
appears less likely for two reasons: First, the regressions control for education, gender, and urban/rural location. 
Second, it is not clear a-priori why selection on unobservables would differ between youth and adults.  18 
 
 
5.3  Explaining Disparities in Employment Loss  
 
This section presents results from two decompositions that seek to better understand how changes in 
employment, as a share of the population, differed across groups. As explained in the methodology 
section above, the first one decomposes the change in the employment to population ratio into portions 
explained by changes in employment rates (as a proportion of the labor force) and participation rates 
within  each  group.  The  second  one  revisits  group  disparities  and  decomposes  differences  in 
employment ratios with differences in initial level of employment, employment patterns in sector (or 
status), and within sector (or status) employment growth. 
For all types of workers, falls in employment mainly led to increased unemployment rather than reduced 
participation. Recall that falls in employment, as a percentage of the population, can either lead to 
increased  unemployment  or  withdrawal  from  the  labor  force.  Table  3  shows  the  result  of  this 
decomposition for different groups.
39 For example,  in the average country,  men’s employment ratio 
slowed  by  -2.5  percentage  points,  of  which  2  percentage  points  (about  80  percent)  was  due  to 
accelerating unemployment and the remaining -0.54 percentage points (about 20 percent) was due to 
slowing participation.  The results reinforce the aggregate trends displayed in Figure 1, which shows 
larger changes in unemployment than participation. Over the six groups, on average, 82 percent of the 
slowdown in employment as a share of the population was due to increased unemployment, while only 
18 percent was due to declines in participation. 
Declines in participation were surprisingly large for youth. Youth may have reacted to the downturn by 
remaining in or returning to school, while the opportunity cost of schooling is lower. Although data on 
educational  attendance  is unavailable, changes in participation rates  are  consistent with a delay of 
youth’s entrance into labor market or the exit from it. In particular, more than a quarter of youth’s 
employment slowdown is attributable to the slowdown in participation, which is slightly higher than the 
average 18 percent for all workers (Table 3). In other words, displaced youth are more likely to leave the 
labor market than the displaced adults. Men, meanwhile, also experienced slightly larger reductions in 
participation rates than women, in line with the mild added worker effect shown in Figure 7.  
The particularly large slowdown in men’s employment can primarily be attributed to higher initial levels 
of employment. Table 4 decomposes the gender disparities in employment loss into three components: 
The  initial  employment  gap,  differences  in  sector  (status)  of  employment,  and  differences  in 
employment growth rates within sector (status).
40 The first component, shown i n the 4th column of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
39 In table 3, unemployment increases are shown as declines in the share of the labor force employed, which is the 
same thing. 
40 Note that the average gender gap in employment as a share of population of the 17 countries is  -1.16 
percentage points, indicating that employment slowed 1.16 percentage points more for men than women. 
employment slowdown for men than women by 1.16 percentage points. This is consistent with figure 5. Since 19 
 
Table 4, is what the gender disparity would be if men and women experienced the same percentage 
reductions in employment. Because men have higher initial rates of employment, equivalent percentage 
reduction will lead men to greater reductions in employment, as a share of the population, for men. The 
large part of the average gender disparity in employment -- roughly 58 percent – can be explained by 
men’s higher rates of initial employment (fourth column of the top row).  
Men’s greater presence in the industrial sector, however, also led to significant employment losses. The 
fifth column of Table 4 gives the portion of the gender employment disparity attributable to different 
sectoral work patterns. This indicates what the employment disparity would be if men and women had 
the same initial level of employment and the same percentage employment reductions in each sector, 
while maintaining their actual pre-crisis sectoral employment patterns. On average, the difference in 
sectoral employment patterns accounted for 37 percent of the total gender disparity. This is mostly due 
to the greater percentage of men that work in the industrial sector as seen in Figure A1, and industrial 
sector experienced a large employment loss.  
There is scant evidence that women suffered greater employment losses than men within sectors. The 
sixth column of Table 4 shows what the disparity would have been had men and women had the same 
initial rates of employment and the same propensity to work in the three main sectors. This gives an 
indication of whether  percentage reductions in each sector’s employment favored men  or women. 
Considering only percentage changes in sectoral employment, on average men would have had about a 
-0.1 percentage point greater reduction in employment, accounting for 6 percent of the total disparity in 
employment. The results are similar for the decomposition by employment status. While there are a few 
exceptions, gender disparities caused by within sector (status) differences in employment growth rates 
were generally small.
41 In other words, percentage changes in employment did not consistently favor 
men or women, and in most countries they were close to gender-neutral.  
Unlike men, youth suffered far larger employment losses than adults within each sector and status of 
employment. Table 5 shows the same decomposition of the large age disparity in employment by status 
(the left half of Table 5). Overall, percentage employment reductions within status were much larger for 
youth than adults, and this accounted for an enormous average employment disparity equal to 2.8 
percentage points. A larger proportion of adults than youth works, however, which mitigates these age 
disparities as a share of the population. Finally, differences in employment status played only a marginal 
role  in  explaining  differences  by  age  group.  In  results  not  shown,  similar  results  were  found  for 
decompositions  by  sector.    Overall,  the  results  are  consistent  with  firms  in  each  sector  reducing 
employment disproportionately for youth.  
Higher initial employment rates, as well as a greater tendency to work in wage employment, contributed 
to greater employment reductions among the better educated. Although the differences were not as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
sector information is missing among 3 countries (Macedonia, Poland, and South Africa), the average gender gap of 
the remaining 14 countries, -1.29 percentage points, are used for decomposition by sector.  
41 The exceptions include three countries – Latvia, Lithuania and Turkey–where men experienced much larger employment 
slowdown within sector (status) than women, and three countries– Indonesia, Costa Rica, and Jordan – where within sector 
(status) employment slowdown was sigfificantly larger for women. 20 
 
stark  as  the  gender  and  youth  disparities,  better  educated  persons  experienced  surprisingly  large 
reductions in employment rates, and the right half of Table 5 sheds some light on the factors causing the 
larger  employment  reductions  among  the  better  educated.  Like  youth,  but  to  a  lesser  extent,  less 
educated workers experienced greater percentage reductions in employment within both wage and 
self-employed work. Like men, however, people with more education are more likely to work than those 
with  less  education.  This  alone  would  have  negated  the  employment  disadvantage  faced  by  less 
educated workers within each sector. The deciding factor in this case is that better educated workers 
tended to be clustered in wage employment jobs; since employment reductions were greater in wage 
employment than self-employment, this led to greater employment reductions among better educated 
workers.  
6  Conclusion 
 
This paper identifies groups in 17 middle-income countries that experienced the greatest labor market 
dislocations during the 2009 financial crisis.  Most conjectures about the vulnerability of different groups 
are based on three potential mechanisms: uneven exposure to the shock across sectors or status of 
employment, firms’ employment decisions, and households’ labor supply decisions in response to the 
crisis. Previous findings from this and previous crises, particularly the two well-documented cases in 
Indonesia and Argentina, suggested four hypotheses: Employment outcomes were similar for men and 
women, youth experienced greater increases in unemployment, adjustments for less educated workers 
were more severe, and that the shock reduced employment more in urban areas.   
Youth experienced the greatest employment dislocations. As in past crises, young workers experienced 
large reductions in employment, and their shift from wage employment to unemployment during this 
crisis was particularly striking. For most dislocated youth, self-employment did not provide a buffer to 
compensate for fewer wage jobs. Supply side factors also may have contributed to increases in youth 
unemployment during the downturn. For example, youth may have less access to information about the 
labor market than adults, leading them to delay adjusting their reservation wages, and youth likely 
benefited more than adults from parents’ largess during the downturn.   
Unlike  past  crises,  in  which  men  and  women  experienced  similar  employment  changes,  overall 
employment rates declined markedly more for men. Men experienced substantially larger declines in the 
percentage of the population that is employed. Unlike for youth, however, percentage employment 
declines  within  sector  were  nearly  equal  for  men  and  women.  There  is  no  evidence  that  firms 
systematically discriminated against women when reducing employment.    
Women were only slightly more likely to remain in the labor force than men, and they did not enter self-
employment  except in the  worst-hit  countries.  Gender  differences in participation were  small, even 
among the less educated. In this respect, added worker effects during this crisis generally were more 
similar to the past crisis in urban Argentina, where there was little increase in female self-employment, 
than Indonesia, where female self-employment increased substantially. The exceptions are Latvia and 21 
 
Lithuania, which experienced GDP slowdowns exceeding 20 percentage points, and women experienced 
much larger increases in self-employment.   
There were few striking differences by education or urban residence. Disparities between less and more 
educated groups tended to be small, partly because of offsetting responses among middle and highly 
educated workers. Workers with medium levels of education – typically junior high school graduates – 
were  impacted  most  by  the  crisis,  as  measured  by  declines  in  employment  and  increases  in 
unemployment, while workers at the extremes of the education distribution suffered smaller declines.  
The  evidence  for  urban  and  rural  disparities  is  mixed,  although  in  most  countries,  urban  workers 
experienced greater falls in employment but greater increases in hours and earnings than rural workers.   
Firm  decisions,  initial  employment  rates,  and  occupational  segregation  all  can  contribute  to  group 
disparities. In absolute terms, youth and men experienced the largest declines in employment and wage 
employment  as  a  percentage  of  the  population,  which  is  arguably  the  indicator  most  relevant  for 
assessing mitigation policies that apply to the entire population. For youth, larger percentage reductions 
in employment were partially mitigated by the fact that a larger percentage of adults work. For men, on 
the other hand, both their concentration in the industrial sector and even more importantly, higher 
initial employment rates, contributed to greater employment reductions.  
To address the decline in youth employment, policies can either seek to increase labor demand for youth, 
or assist youth in making better career decisions. Youth experienced declines in employment in each 
sector and status of employment, but the limited evidence available shows no systematic declines in 
hours and wages. This suggests that firms reacted to reports of economic instability by laying off or 
freezing the hiring of their least experienced employees. Sub-minimum wages and job subsidies for 
youth can partially counteract these layoffs by encouraging firms to retain or hire youth during the 
downturn. Educational subsidies can also encourage youth to respond to acquire additional schooling, 
rather  than  remain  idle,  during  periods  of  declining  employment  opportunities.  Finally,  job  search 
assistance, including the dissemination of accurate information on labor market conditions, can help 
youth make more informed decisions during tumultuous economic times.   
Scaling up existing programs targeted to disadvantaged groups, such as unskilled, female, or urban 
workers, may not benefit those most affected by job loss due to crisis. Training or other active labor 
market programs are often targeted to youth, unskilled, and female workers, who are perceived to be at 
a disadvantage in the labor market. However, with the exception of youth, these programs are not 
always  well-targeted  to  the  industrial  and  wage  workers  who  sufferred  the  largest  employment 
contractions during the crisis. Turkey, for example, responded to the crisis in part by extending a wage 
subsidy program that reduces working women’s social security contributions. Although this subsidy may 
have been effective in boosting low participation rates prior to the crisis, it did not benefit the majority 
of those that sufferred job loss, and may have exacerbated employment loss for Turkish men.   
Finally,  the  results  confirm  the  importance  of  country-specific  information  when  targeting  policy 
responses to crises. Outside Latvia and Lithuania, the size of disparities between groups was usually 
weakly related to the size of the shock. Although there were no consistent patterns across countries for 22 
 
many indicators and groups, disparities were often large. Although the analysis focused on general 
patterns, groups in each country responded differently to the shock, meaning that country-specific data 
are critical to help policymakers gauge the optimal policy response. Furthermore, this study only covers 
17 countries, selected on the basis of data availability, and the patterns of adjustment in other countries 
may be different. Further development of data collection and dissemination systems will enable the 
policy response to this and future crises to better serve the needs of the most severely affected workers.   
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Table 1:  Data used for the analysis 
Region  Country 
Slowdown  in 
GDP growth 




Household survey (EPH) 





-self employed and 
family worker combined 
Brazil 





-Urban only  
-Rotational panel 
-No agricultural sector 
Chile 
-5.7  National survey of 
Employment (ENE) 




-No earnings info 
Costa Rica 
-5.4  Multi –purpose 
Household survey (EHPM) 
2006-2009  Annually   
Mexico 
-11.2  National Survey of 
Occupation and 
Employment (ENOE) 








-1.7  Indonesian Labor force 
Survey (Sakernas) 
Feb 2006 - 
Feb 2009 
Biannually 
-Earnings only for wage 
and salary workers 
 
Philippines 









Egypt  -2.5 
Egyptian Labor Force 
Survey (ELFS) 
2006-2009  Quarterly  -rotational panel 













- Cell means by gender, 
education, and age 
reported by Eurostat  
-  Urban/rural 
breakdown only 
available for selected 
outcomes  




Lithuania  -21.3 
Macedonia   -6.1 
Poland  -4.2 
Romania  -12.2 





Labor force Survey and 





-Earnings not available 
-urban/rural information 
not available 
-sector information is not 
available 
Note: Slowdown in GDP growth rate due to the recession is calculated as GDP growth rate in 2009 compared from the average GDP growth 
rates in 2007-2008. For detailed numbers, see Appendix Table A1. 
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Table 2. An Example:  changes in trend from pre to post crisis in Mexico 
  Employment ratio 
(percent) 
Year-on-Year Change 












Year/Quarter  1Q  2Q  3Q  4Q  1Q  2Q  3Q  4Q  2007-
2008 
2009   
A.  One cell: Low educated male youth in urban areas   
2007   57.3  57.4  58.2  60.8  -  -  -  -       
2008   57.8  58.3  57.8  57.0  0.5  0.9  -0.4  -2.2  -0.3     
2009   54.2  53.9  54.1  -  -3.6  -4.4  -2.7  -    -3.6  -3.3 
B.  All: weighted average of 16 cells   
2007   61.3  61.7  61.6  63.0  -  -  -  -       
2008   61.8  62.4  62.0  61.4  0.5  0.7  0.4  -1.6  0.0     
2009   60.2  60.4  60.6  -  -1.6  -2.0  -1.4  -    -1.7  -1.7 28 
 
Table 3. Decomposition of Employment Ratio between Changes due to Employment Rate and Labor Force Participation 
  
  
(1)  Precrisis (2006-2008) 
  
  
(2)  Post (2008-2009) 
  
  
(3)  Difference 
  
   employment 
ratio change 
changes due to   employment 
ratio change 
 changes due to  employment 
ratio change 












0.67  0.38  0.29  -1.87  -1.62  -0.25  -2.54  -2.00  -0.54 
 [100%]  [56.8%]  [43.2%]  [100%]   [86.4%]  [13.6%]  [100%]   [78.6%]  [21.4%] 
Women 
1.02  0.45  0.56  -0.36  -0.73  0.36  -1.38  -1.18  -0.20 
 [100%]  [44.1%]  [54.9%]  [100%]  [202.8%]  [-100.0%]  [100%]  [85.5%]  [14.5%] 
Young  
0.72  0.50  0.21  -1.91  -1.46  -0.45  -2.62  -1.96  -0.66 
 [100%]  [69.9%]  [30.1%]  [100% ]  [76.5%]  [23.5%]   [100%]  [74.7%]  [25.3%] 
Old 
0.78  0.34  0.45  -0.96  -1.13  0.17  -1.74  -1.47  -0.27 
 [100%]  [43.0%]  [57.0%]   [100%]  [118.1%]  [-18.1%]   [100%]  [84.4%]  [15.6%] 
Low Edu 
0.39  0.24  0.15  -1.13  -1.07  -0.06  -1.52  -1.31  -0.21 
 [100%]  [60.5%]  [39.5%]   [100%]  [95.1%]  [4.9%]   [100%]  [86.2%]  [13.8%] 
High Edu 
0.82  0.52  0.30  -1.28  -1.22  -0.06  -2.10  -1.74  -0.36 
 [100%]  [63.5%]  [36.5%]   [100%]  [95.4%]  [4.6%]   [100%]  [82.9%]  [17.1%] 
Note: Numbers are for average over all 17 countries. Each proportion of change explained by employment rate and labor force participation is presented in the 
brackets. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of Gender Disparities in Employment Ratio Changes by Sector and Status 
    Sector  Status 








changes due to 















Average    -1.29  -0.74  -0.48  -0.07  -1.16  -0.65  -0.18  -0.33 
(Percent)    (100%)  (57.6%)  (36.9%)  (5.5%)  (100%)  (55.8%)  (15.6%)  (28.6%) 
LAC  Argentina  -0.82  0.03  -1.10  0.26  -0.82  0.07  0.15  -1.03 
  Brazil  -0.99  -0.39  -0.15  -0.45  -0.99  -0.41  -0.05  -0.52 
  Chile  -0.92  -1.25  -0.50  0.83  -0.92  -1.19  -0.66  0.92 
  Costa Rica  -0.29  -1.93  -1.47  3.11  -0.29  -0.98  -3.79  4.47 
  Mexico  -0.79  -1.00  -0.35  0.55  -0.79  -0.84  -0.05  0.10 
EAP  Indonesia  2.22  -0.63  0.02  2.83  2.22  -0.69  -1.17  4.08 
  Philippines  -0.72  0.32  -0.26  -0.78  -0.72  0.25  -0.03  -0.93 
MENA  Egypt  0.26  -1.82  1.36  0.72  0.26  -1.67  1.56  0.37 
  Jordan  -0.10  -2.27  0.06  2.11  -0.10  -2.16  0.28  1.78 
ECA  Bulgaria  -0.92  -0.57  -1.21  0.86  -0.92  -0.56  0.14  -0.50 
  Latvia  -5.80  -0.83  -1.67  -3.29  -5.80  -0.87  0.85  -5.78 
  Lithuania  -6.31  -0.05  -0.76  -5.50  -6.31  -0.05  0.83  -7.08 
  Macedonia          1.16  0.00  -0.07  1.24 
  Poland          -1.18  -0.52  0.05  -0.72 
  Romania  -0.68  -0.12  -0.71  0.16  -0.68  -0.12  -0.03  -0.52 




        -1.66  -0.93  -0.51  -0.22 
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Table 5. Decomposition of Age and Education Disparities in Employment Ratio Changes by Status 
    Youth (vs. adults)  Least educated (vs. more educated) 








changes due to 















Average    -0.88  2.14  -0.23  -2.79  0.58  1.13  0.55  -1.10 
(Percent)    (100.0%)  (-242.8%)  (26.6%)  (316.2%)  (100.0%)  (194.6%)  (95.2%)  (-189.8%) 
LAC  Argentina  0.68  -0.29  -0.32  1.28  -1.05  0.00  0.02  -1.08 
  Brazil  -1.28  0.70  0.26  -2.24  0.77  0.21  -0.14  0.70 
  Chile  -0.47  1.81  -1.23  -1.05  0.27  0.15  1.53  -1.41 
  Costa Rica  -4.01  1.67  -1.66  -4.01  -0.92  0.13  1.54  -2.59 
  Mexico  -1.48  0.97  -0.40  -2.06  0.71  0.21  0.13  0.37 
EAP  Indonesia  -2.40  0.98  0.85  -4.23  -0.98  -0.16  0.29  -1.11 
  Philippines  0.00  -0.58  -0.54  1.13  0.91  0.16  0.75  -0.01 
MENA  Egypt  -1.00  1.45  0.11  -2.56  0.37  0.21  -2.87  3.02 
  Jordan  0.51  0.51  -0.44  0.43  -0.39  0.39  -0.20  -0.57 
ECA  Bulgaria  1.31  4.27  -0.10  -2.87  1.73  3.16  0.23  -1.66 
  Latvia  -1.42  7.95  -0.75  -8.62  0.91  7.20  0.20  -6.48 
  Lithuania  -4.03  7.88  -0.68  -11.23  3.58  3.95  1.59  -1.96 
  Macedonia  -0.91  0.92  0.73  -2.56  1.43  0.31  1.68  -0.56 
  Poland  0.08  2.48  0.07  -2.47  0.40  2.71  0.76  -3.07 
  Romania  -0.01  0.84  0.52  -1.37  0.97  -0.20  1.34  -0.18 








Figure 1. Overall Adjustments among Population: employment indicators 
   
Note: The horizontal axis represents the slowdown in real GDP growth rate as defined in Table 1. The vertical axis is analogously defined as 
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 Figure 2.  Overall Adjustments among Labor Force: Unemployment rate and employment status 
 
Note: See note for figure 1. All four indicators are measured as a share of the active labor force. Self-employment includes self-employed and 
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Figure 3. Overall Adjustments among Labor Force: Unemployment rate and employment sector  
 
See note for figure 1 
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Figure 4.  Overall Adjustments among Workers: Earnings, hours, and wage rates 
 
See note for figure 1 
 



















































































































Figure 5.  Group comparisons: employment to population ratio 
 
Note:  The figure shows the disparity between groups, controlling for other characteristics, in the slowdown in the employment to population 
ratio. The plotted number is the coefficient from regression for each country (equation (3) in Appendix B). The horizontal axis represents the 
slowdown in real GDP growth rate as defined in Table 1. Two letter codes represent countries.   



































































































Lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Employment Ratio36 
 
Figure 6.  Group comparisons: Wage employee to population ratio   
 















































































































lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Wage employee ratio37 
 
Figure 7.  Group comparisons: Non-participation to population ratio   
 




































































































Lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Nonparticipation Ratio38 
 
Figure 8.  Group comparisons: unemployment rate 
 
















































































































Lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Unemployment Rate: among Labor Force39 
 
Figure 9.  Group comparisons: share of wage employment among labor force 
 




































































































Lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Share of Wage Employment: among Labor Force40 
 
Appendix A. Labor Market Adjustment by Gender 
Table A1. GDP growth rates and their slowdown 
  Annual GDP Growth Rates    Average GDP growth rates 
  2007  2008  2009    2007-2008  2009  slowdown 
Argentina  8.7  6.8  0.9    7.8  0.9  -6.9 
Brazil  6.1  2.8  -0.2    4.5  -0.2  -4.7 
Bulgaria  6.2  5.1  -5.0    5.7  -5.0  -10.7 
Chile  4.6  3.7  -1.5    4.2  -1.5  -5.7 
Costa Rica  7.9  0.7  -1.1    4.3  -1.1  -5.4 
Egypt   7.1  7.2  4.7    7.1  4.7  -2.5 
Indonesia  6.3  6.0  4.5    6.2  4.5  -1.7 
Jordan  8.9  7.8  2.8    8.3  2.8  -5.6 
Latvia  10.0  -4.6  -18.0    2.7  -18.0  -20.7 
Lithuania  9.8  2.8  -15.0    6.3  -15.0  -21.3 
Macedonia  5.9  4.8  -0.7    5.4  -0.7  -6.1 
Mexico  3.3  6.0  -6.5    4.7  -6.5  -11.2 
Philippines  7.1  3.8  0.9    5.5  0.9  -4.5 
Poland  6.8  5.0  1.7    5.9  1.7  -4.2 
Romania  6.3  3.8  -7.1    5.1  -7.1  -12.2 
South Africa  5.5  7.3  -1.8    6.4  -1.8  -8.2 
Turkey  4.7  0.7  -4.7    2.7  -4.7  -7.4 




Table A2. Labor Market Adjustments by Gender  
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Argentina -0.59 0.81 1.31 0.70 -0.72 -1.51 1.45 1.56 -1.29 -2.17 -0.17 0.61 -0.92 -0.06 -9.20 -5.67 -5.72 -7.39 -3.48 1.73
Brazil -1.65 -0.81 1.28 0.59 0.37 0.22 1.72 0.96 -1.14 -0.50 -0.57 -0.46 . . -0.99 -0.12 -0.18 -0.18 -0.81 0.06
Chile -2.51 -1.47 1.57 0.34 0.94 1.13 2.36 1.17 -3.79 -2.76 1.42 1.59 -0.42 -0.49 . . -0.96 -1.44 . .
Costa Rica -3.15 -1.37 2.25 2.17 0.90 -0.80 3.27 5.44 -4.53 -6.28 1.26 0.85 0.55 -1.52 -5.27 -2.20 -6.25 -7.43 0.98 5.23
Mexico -1.95 -1.24 1.09 0.56 0.86 0.68 1.53 1.31 -1.70 -1.43 0.17 0.12 0.42 -0.45 -5.24 -4.54 -0.91 -0.30 -4.33 -4.24
Indonesia 0.71 -1.75 -1.25 -1.05 0.54 2.80 -1.04 -1.48 -0.46 1.30 1.49 0.17 1.81 -0.45 3.33 -4.47 0.14 -0.35 3.19 -4.12
Philippines 0.14 0.90 0.33 0.15 -0.48 -1.06 0.39 -0.06 -1.18 -0.88 0.79 0.94 -0.79 -0.03 3.63 2.12 -5.07 -4.95 3.63 2.12
Egypt -0.74 -0.93 0.02 1.44 0.73 -0.51 0.14 5.11 1.18 1.32 -1.32 -6.42 -2.13 -6.00 -8.64 -13.25 3.11 8.79 -11.75 -22.04
Jordan -0.03 -0.39 0.36 -0.03 -0.33 0.43 0.26 0.30 -0.95 -0.35 0.69 0.06 0.12 0.00 -2.83 -4.12 3.37 2.56 -6.20 -6.68
Bulgaria -4.68 -3.40 2.02 1.48 2.66 1.92 3.19 4.08 -3.54 -4.00 0.36 -0.08 . . . . . . . .
Latvia -12.24 -6.46 9.14 4.63 3.10 1.83 14.14 8.69 -14.15 -10.52 0.01 1.83 . . . . . . . .
Lithuania -7.86 -1.63 7.98 3.38 -0.11 -1.75 12.29 5.52 -12.63 -7.65 0.34 2.13 . . . . . . . .
Macedonia 0.60 -0.88 -0.56 -0.26 -0.03 1.14 -0.90 0.70 -1.07 -0.81 1.97 0.11 . . . . . . . .
Poland -2.94 -1.85 3.30 2.47 -0.36 -0.63 5.40 4.72 -5.02 -4.19 -0.39 -0.52 . . . .
Romania -0.85 -0.05 1.28 1.15 -0.43 -1.10 1.75 1.73 -2.54 -1.71 0.79 -0.01 . . . .
Turkey -1.79 0.39 1.83 0.78 -0.04 -1.17 2.56 2.41 -2.92 -3.19 0.36 0.78 . . . .




Self Employment Agriculture Earnings  Nonparticipation Unemployment Wage employment Hours Wage Rates
LAC
Region country
Among Population Among Active Labor Force Among Workers
Employmenmt Unemployment
Notes: The difference between the annual percentage point change in 2009 and the average annual change between 2006 and 2008 for each outcome by gender is presented.  
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Figure A3. Age and gender comparisons with three groups: Employment Ratio   
 
























































































































lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Employment ratio44 
 
Figure A4. Gender comparisons by education: Employment, Unemployment ratio, Non-participation 
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lines indicate mean value and running line smooth
Non-Participation ratio45 
 
Appendix B. Technical Note 
(1)  Regression 
Our analysis is based on the estimated coefficients from descriptive regressions of year on year outcome 
changes on worker characteristics for each outcome of interest. Each regression is conditioned on four 
worker characteristics:  their gender, age group – a youth (15 to 24) or adult (25 to 64), education group 
– least educated or better educated, and urban or rural residence.
42   
(1)  t i i t i t i t i t t i Rural Educ Age Men Y , , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 ,               
where  t i Y ,  is an average year on year change in labor market outcome for a cell iand time t in each 
country. When annual data is used and t=2008,  2007 , 2008 , 2008 , i i i Y Y Y    . If quarterly data is used, then 
we use average year on year change, and t=2008,  4 / ) (
4
1




q i q i i Y Y Y .   
In order to estimate how the great recession changes the effect of each worker characteristics 
on the trend of outcomes, we estimate the following equation pooling all periods for each country: 
(2) 
i i i i i
i i i i i
Rural Educ Age Men Crisis I
Rural Educ Age Men Y
    
    
~ ) ( ) 1 (
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
4 3 2 1
4 3 2 1
      
     
 
where  ) 1 (  Crisis I indicates the experience of the recession, that is  2009  t . Each  is our coefficient 
of interest that reflects the change of the relationship between worker characteristics and outcomes. In 
figures 5 through 9, we plot all ’s  for each country and labor market outcomes. 
Given the linearity of the equations above, note that estimating ’s from the equation (2) is 
equivalent to the following equation 
(3)  i i i i i i Rural Educ Age Men Y       ~ ~




                                            Note that                    is an average of        
over  2009  t  and                    is an average of        over  2008  t .  
 
                                                            
42 Relatively well educated workers are those who graduated from junior secondary or above, except in Eastern 
European countries. In these countries, the vast majority of workers attended junior high school. Therefore, well 
educated workers are those that graduated from high school or college.  46 
 
Observations are weighted according to the product of the cell’s survey weights and the number 
of observations used to generate the average, when available.
43 The outcomes are the ratio of the 
employed, unemployed, and non-participants among population, the proportion of unemployed, wage 
employed, and self employed among the labor force, and hourly wage, hours of work, and monthly 
earnings for the employed.  
We repeat the same exercise of estimation separately by gender, assum ing that the effects of 
demographic characteristics on outcomes may vary by gender. Based on the results for each country 
separately by gender, Table B2 presents the median of each ’s.   
(2)  Decompositions 
The  main  outcome  of  interest  is                                                                   
where emp denotes the employment ratio for each gender (m, f) for each time period of pre and post 
crisis as defined in the text, and                 for all variables.  
We  first  examine  to  what  extent  the  change  in  employment  ratio  is  explained  by  changes  in 
employment rate and labor force participation.  
                      
                                          
                                          
where                        denotes  employment  ratio,  employment  rate,  and  labor  force 
participation, respectively, using                     . Taking an average of equations (A.1) and (A.2) 
yields 
                                                    
 
The first term is the portion of the change in the employment ratio that is explained by change in 
employment  rate,  while  the  second  term  is  the  portion  explained  by  the  change  in  labor  force 
participation. We show this decomposition for each group of gender, age, and education.  
We then move on to another type of decomposition exercise, examining differences across groups. We 
note that the initial level of employment and distribution across sector and status of employment vary 
by each group.  
                                                            
43 Weighting by the number of unweighted observations corrects for heteroscedasticity in the dependent variable, 
which is a cell mean. In countries where the number of unweighted observations is unavailable, we assume they 
are proportional to the group’s population proportion.   
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Let       
     
    
  be a share of sector i for each gender at t, where         . The relationship between 
an employment ratio in each sector and overall employment ratio is 
(A.4)                    
where        
     
    
   the  share  of  the  population  employed  in  sector  i,  and       
    
    
,  the 
employment to population ratio.  
The  growth  rate  of  overall  employment  and  sector  specific  employment  are  denoted  by    and      
respectively:              –           and                                 
Using an equation (3), the following relationship holds for each gender 
         
     
   
        
      
                                   
Given that         , taking summation in both sides,                                      , yields 
(A.5)                   
A.5  indicates  that  the  percentage  change  in  the  employment  to  population  ratio  is  equal  to  the 
weighted average of each sector’s percnetage employment changes, as a share of total employment. 
The employment change in each period can then be expressed 
(A.6)                                                    
Each term represents three factors that combine to explain the difference between groups’ employment 
change: Different initial employment level (     , different sectoral distributions (   ), and different 
percentage employment changes within each sector (    ).  
Since  there  are  three  factors  whose  product  is  the  change  in  employment,  we  utilize  a  Shapley 
decomposition to examine the contribution of each factor in explaining group disparities. This involves 
averaging the contribution of each of three factors over 6 unique permutations in which one variable is 
varied while others are held constant. The first permutation involves first varying initial employment 
rates (using male values for sectoral distribution and within-sector changes), then varying the sectoral 
distribution, and finally varying the within-sector percentage employment changes.   
For simplicity, the time subscript t is omitted and the gender difference is decomposed as 
(A.7)                   
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Then ① is the difference due to the initial employment gap, ② is due to the differences in sectoral 
distributions, and ③ is due to differences in within sector employment growth rates.  
There are a total of six permutations of the decomposition, which are listed below:   
 
(A.6)                                                      
                      
 
                                           
   
 
                      
 
                                           
   
 
                      
 
                                           
   
 
                      
 
                                           
   
 
                      
 
                                           
   
 
                      
 
                                           
   
  
For  the  decomposition  exercise  in  the  text,  we  report  the  average  share  for  each  of  the  three 
components of these six equations. 
 